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ABSTRACT
We extend our earlier work, focusing on the links between capital account liberalization, legal and
institutional development, and financial development, especially that in equity markets. In a panel
data analysis encompassing 108 countries and twenty years ranging from 1980 to 2000, we explore
several dimensions of the financial sector. First, we test whether financial openness can lead to
equity market development when we control for the level of legal and institutional development.
Then, we examine whether the opening of the goods sector is a precondition for financial opening.
Finally, we investigate whether a well-developed banking sector is a precondition for financial
liberalization to lead to equity market development and also whether bank and equity market
development complements or substitutes. Our empirical results suggest that a higher level of
financial openness contributes to the development of equity markets only if a threshold level of
general legal systems and institutions is attained, which is more prevalent among emerging market
countries. Among emerging market countries, a higher level of bureaucratic quality and law and
order, as well as the lower levels of corruption, increases the effect of financial opening in fostering
the development of equity markets. We also find that the finance-related legal/institutional variables
do not enhance the effect of capital account opening as strongly as the general legal/institutional
variables. In examining the issue of the sequencing, we find that the liberalization in cross-border
goods transactions is found to be a precondition for capital account liberalization. Our findings also
indicate that the development in the banking sector is a precondition for equity market development,
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1.  Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in issues surrounding globalization, 
including financial globalization. A series of financial crises in the 1990s rekindled the debates 
over the effects of removing capital controls, which led many observers to reconsider the balance 
between the costs and benefits of financial liberalization (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001a,b, 
2002; Schmukler, 2003).
1 
Many studies have adopted the position that capital account liberalization can affect 
economic development through financial development; specifically, liberalized financial markets 
may contribute to developing financial markets that provide funds to borrowers who may have 
productive investment opportunities.
2 Theory suggests that capital account liberalization can lead 
to development of financial systems through several channels. First, financial liberalization may 
mitigate financial repression in protected financial markets, allowing the (real) interest rate to rise 
to its competitive market equilibrium (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Second, removing capital 
controls allows domestic and foreign investors to engage in more portfolio diversification. These 
two points can be summarized as that financial liberalization may reduce the cost of capital and 
increasing its availability for the borrowers. Stulz (1999) shows that financial globalization 
reduces the cost of equity capital because of the reduction in the expected returns to compensate 
risk as well as in agency costs (also, Henry, 2000; Bekaert et al., 2000, 2001). Third, not least, the 
liberalization process usually increases the efficiency level of the financial system by weeding out 
inefficient financial institutions and creating greater pressure for a reform of the financial 
infrastructure (Claesens et al., 2001; Stulz, 1999; Stiglitz 2000). Such an improvement in financial 
infrastructure may alleviate information asymmetry, decreasing adverse selection and moral 
hazard, and further raising the availability of credit.  
The link between financial liberalization and financial development is not unequivocal, 
however. It is often argued that to benefit from more open cross-border financial transactions, 
                                                            
1 In this study we do not discuss the merits of capital controls in the context of financial crises.  For a review, see 
Aizenman (2002). Kletzer and Mody (2000) survey the debate in the context of “self-protection policies” for emerging 
markets. Ito (2004) investigates the correlation between financial liberalization and the output performance of 
crisis-hit economies. 
2  See for instance Leahy, et al. (2001) for OECD-specific results. Klein and Olivei (2001) document the linkage 
between financial development and economic growth for developed countries, and its absence for less developed 
countries. Spiegel (2001) examines an APEC sample, while Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) document the 
fragility of many of these group-specific results. IMF (2001, Chapter 4) surveys both the growth and finance, and 
finance and liberalization literatures. For the most recent review on finance and growth, refer to Quinn, et al. (2002)   2 
financial systems need to be equipped with reasonable legal and institutional infrastructure.  
In economies where the legal system does not clearly define property rights or guarantee the 
enforcement of contracts, the incentives for loan activities can be limited. Legal protections for 
creditors and the level of credibility and transparency of accounting rules are also likely to affect 
economic agents’ financial decisions.
3 Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) investigate whether the 
level of legal and regulatory determinants of financial development influences the development 
financial intermediary sector. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV, 
1997, 1998) argue that the national legal origin (whether English, French, German, or 
Scandinavian) strongly affects the legal and regulatory environment in financial transactions and 
explains cross-country differences in financial development. LLSV (1997, 1998) and Levine 
(1998, 2003) show that low levels of shareholder rights are associated with poorly developed 
equity markets (especially in French civil law countries). In contrast, Common law countries have 
high levels of shareholder rights with correspondingly high levels of equity market development 
(Claessens, et al., 2002 and Caprio, et al., 2003), and that greater creditor rights are positively 
associated with financial intermediary development.
4 
Clearly, the link between financial liberalization and financial development is of great 
importance to emerging market policymakers, and naturally, one needs to examine the effect of 
liberalizing cross-border financial transactions in the context the institutional setting. However, 
very little investigation has been made to shed light on the link in such a context. This is the topic 
of our study. 
In this article, we extend our work (Chinn and Ito, 2002) focusing on the links between 
capital account liberalization, legal and institutional development, and financial development. 
Since our study is motivated by the development of equity markets through financial liberalization 
and its contribution to economic development among emerging market countries in the 1990s, our 
focus is on the effect of capital account liberalization on the development of equity markets among 
less developed and emerging market countries. We conduct a panel data analysis encompassing 
108 countries (including 21 industrialized countries and 31 emerging market countries) and twenty 
                                                            
3 For the analysis of legal development on financial development, see Beck and Levine (2004), Claessens, et al. 
(2002), Caprio, et al. (2003), and Johnson, et al. (2002). For a general discussion on the importance of legal and 
institutional foundations for financial development, see Beim and Calomiris (2001) and Stultz (1999). 
4 Rajan and Zingales (2003), on the other hand, question the link between legal origins and cross-country difference in 
financial development, and instead stress the important role of political forces in shaping policies toward financial 
markets and their development.   3 
years ranging from 1980 to 2000. In addition to searching for the effects of each set of factors, we 
examine the oft-discussed issue of the sequence of liberalization. It has been often argued that 
countries need to liberalize their goods market prior to liberalizing financial sector (McKinnon, 
1991). Also, in order for financial systems to reap the benefit of financial liberalization, the 
systems themselves need to be developed up to a certain level, suggesting the importance of a 
sequence of liberalization within the financial sector (Martell and Stulz, 2003). To test these 
claims, we examine whether the opening of the goods sector is a precondition for financial 
opening, and furthermore, investigate whether a well-developed banking sector is a precondition 
for financial liberalization to lead to equity market development. Additionally, we explore whether 
bank and equity market development complements or substitutes. 
Our empirical results suggest that a higher level of legal and institutional development 
contributes both directly and in an interactive manner with financial openness to the development 
of equity markets, but only if a country is equipped with a reasonable level of legal and 
institutional development, which is more prevalent among emerging market countries than 
developing countries. A higher level of bureaucratic quality and law and order, as well as the lower 
levels of corruption, may enhance the effect of financial opening in fostering the development of 
equity markets. We also find that, among emerging market countries, the overall level of 
finance-related legal/institutional development increases stock market trading volumes and 
enhances the effect of financial openness. However, the finance-related legal/institutional 
variables do not exhibit as strong an effect as the general legal/institutional variables. In examining 
the issue of the sequencing, we find that the liberalization in cross-border goods transactions is 
found to be a precondition for capital account liberalization, in a result similar to that obtained by 
Aizenman and Noy (2004). Our findings also indicate that the development in the banking sector is 
a precondition for equity market development, and that the developments in these two types of 
financial markets have interactive effects. 
 
2.  An Econometric Analysis of Openness, Institutions and Financial 
Development 
The link between capital account openness, financial development, and legal/institutional 
environment has been investigated by Chinn and Ito (2002). In this study, we demonstrated that 
financial systems with a higher degree of legal/institutional development on average benefit more   4 
from financial liberalization than those with a lower one. Furthermore, the positive effect of 
legal/institutional development seems to flow primarily from the degree of shareholder protection 
and accounting standards. In what follows, we extend our previous study by employing updated 
data and also exploring more questions related to the link between capital account openness and 
financial development. More specifically, we will investigate the issues relevant to the sequence of 
liberalization between financial and goods cross-border flows and the sequence of development in 
banking and equity markets.  
2.1 The Empirical Specification 
First, we reexamine the long-term effect of capital account openness on financial 
development in a model that controls for the level of legal and institutional development. The 
model is specified as: 
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where FD is a measure of financial development; KAOPEN is a measure of financial openness; X 
is a vector of economic control variables; and L
i refers to a measure of legal or institutional 
development.  
For the capital openness variable, we use the Chinn-Ito index which is described in greater 
detail in a later section and the data appendix. The vector X contains macroeconomic control 
variables that include log per capita income in PPP terms, the inflation rate, and trade openness, 
measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. In this analysis, the set is kept 
fairly small so as to retain some interpretability of the correlations. Log per capita income is 
included as there is a long literature ascribing financial deepening, aside from the role of 
regulation, to the increasing complexity of economic structures associated with rising income. The 
inflation rate is included because it may distort decision-making.
5 In particular, moderate to high 
inflation may discourage financial intermediation, and encourage saving in real assets. Finally, 
trade openness is included as an ad hoc control; many empirical studies find a correlation of trade 
openness with any number of economic variables. The relationship between trade openness and 
financial openness will be investigated more thoroughly in a later section. 
                                                            
5  Since in most cases, the volatility of inflation rises with the inflation rate, the inflation rate could be proxying for 
either or both of these effects.   5 
A series of regressions is conducted for each of the financial development variables (FD), 
which include private credit creation (PCGDP), stock market capitalization (SMKC), stock market 
total value (SMTV), all measured as a ratio of GDP, and stock market turnover (SMTO). Also for 
the series of regressions with different financial development measures, we also include each of 
the nine legal/institutional variables and its interactive term with the capital account openness 
index. The nine legal/institutional variables include those which are pertaining to the general 
development of legal systems or institutions as well as those pertaining particularly to financial 
transactions. Further discussions about the legal/institutional variables are presented in the data 
section.  
In order to avoid problems of endogeneity associated with short term cyclical effects, we 
specify our model as a growth rate on levels regression, akin to a panel error-correction model with 
non-overlapping data. That is, we only sample data every five years between 1980 and 2000, and 
use the five-year average growth of the level of financial development as the dependent variable 
and the “initial conditions” for time-variant explanatory variables, including the initial level of the 
financial development indicator, for each five-year panel.
6 
2.2 The Data 
The data are drawn from a number of sources, primarily the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the databases 
associated with Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). The analysis is based upon data 
originally recorded at an annual frequency, over the 1970-2000 period, covering 108 countries. 
Details are reported in Appendix 1.  
2.2.1 Financial Development Measures  
The measures of financial development are extracted from the dataset of Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). PCGDP, the ratio of private credit from deposit money banks 
to the private sector, represents the overall development in private banking markets.
7 While this 
variable is examined for purposes of comparison, our focus is primarily on the development of 
equity markets development, for which we use three variables as the measures: SMKC (stock 
market capitalization), SMTV (total value of stocks traded), and SMTO (stock market turn over 
                                                            
6 Time fixed effects are also included in the model to control for possible time-specific exogenous shocks. 
7  While many researchers use M2 or liquidity liabilities (M2Y and LLY in our data set), we only report results for 
PCGDP as our focus is on equity market development, and also because the correlation between M2Y or LLY and   6 
ratio). We can consider SMKC as the measure of the size of equity markets and SMTV and SMTO 
as the measure of the activeness of equity markets. 
Regarding the measurement issues surrounding financial development, we must make two 
more notes. First, in this study, we do not look into offshore markets as part of financial 
development, and therefore, focus merely on the development of domestic equity markets. 
Although we have witnessed through the Asian financial crisis that some emerging market 
countries such as Korea and Thailand tried to complement their domestic markets by developing 
offshore markets and allowing foreign investors, mostly hedge funds, to actively engage, there 
have not developed so much literature regarding these issues, mainly owing to the recentness of 
the development of hedge funds and offshore markets.
8 Furthermore, the relationship between 
onshore and offshore funds has not been rigorously investigated (except for Kim and Wei, 2002) 
due to data unavailability.
9 Hence, we do not attempt to link offshore funds to domestic equity 
markets.  
Secondly, our analysis does not consider the effect of capital account liberalization on the 
overseas listings by international firms. Several authors have discussed the process of emerging 
market companies “migrating” to mature markets by listing their shares and trading in New York 
or other major stock markets. The implications of this process is under debate. Claessens et al. 
(2002) and Levine and Schmukler (2003) provide evidence that migration of trading from 
domestic to international markets allows firms to reap from international portfolio diversification 
gains, while contributing to the shrinkage of local markets. On the other hand, Karolyi (2003) 
shows that cross-listings in the form of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) neither facilitate 
nor hinder local market development, but that it “may be an outcome of the declining market 
conditions and not a cause of them.”
10 Given the ambiguity of the effects, and data limitations, we 
focus on the development of domestic equity markets. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
PCGDP is quite high (84.9% and 81.9%, respectively),. 
8 The exceptions include Fung and Hsieh (2001), their other works, Brown and Goetzmann (2001), and Brown et al. 
(1998). 
9 Kim and Wei study the behavior of the Korean offshore market, and find that the Korean offshore funds trade more 
aggressively than onshore markets; but they do not engage in positive feedback trading unlike their onshore 
counterparts; and that they do herd, but not so much as the onshore funds in the U.S. or U.K. which tends to herd more 
during a crisis.   
10 Sarkissian and Schill (2002) show that internationalization of trading is constrained by geographical and 
institutional/cultural familiarity, making the gains from international portfolio diversification small. Their analysis 
shows that overseas listings are not conducted to “overcome investor home bias,” but “reflect the bias.”   7 
Table 1 reports the growth rates of financial development measured in the variables used in 
this study. Inspection of the table reveals that during the 1990s, all subsample groups experienced 
the most rapid development in equity markets, measured along several dimensions, including size 
(SMKC) and transactions activity (SMTV and SMTO). This is true despite the retrenchment in the 
equity markets of less developed and emerging market countries during the second half of the 
decade. Hence, the development of equity markets has progressed – albeit in a halting fashion – for 
the last three decades.   
2.2.2 Capital Openness Index – the Chinn-Ito Index  
It is well known that it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of openness in capital 
account transactions (e.g., Eichengreen, 2002; Edison et al., 2002). Although many measures exist 
to describe the extent and intensity of capital account controls, the consensus is that such measures 
fail to fully capture the complexity of real-world capital controls for a number of reasons.
11  
First, conventional measures of quantifying capital controls (or financial openness) sometimes fail 
to account for the intensity of capital controls. The most prominent example of such measures 
include binary variables based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
12 Second, IMF-based 
variables are too aggregated to depict the intricacy of actual capital controls. Capital controls can 
differ depending on the direction of capital flows (i.e., inflows or outflows) as well as the type of 
financial transactions targeted.
13 Thirdly, it is almost impossible to distinguish between de jure 
and de facto controls on capital transactions. Capital control policies are often implemented 
without explicit policy goals to control the volume and/or type of capital flows. Conversely, as 
Edwards (1999) discusses, it is often the case that the private sector circumvents capital account 
restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls. Therefore, researchers 
                                                            
11  See Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), and Edison et al. (2002) for discussions and comparisons of 
various measures on capital restrictions. Dooley (1996) provides an extensive literature review and Neely (1999) 
presents a descriptive overview of capital controls. 
12 There are binary variables created based on a set of “on-off” clarification, which includes an indicator variable for 
the existence of multiple exchange rates (k1); restrictions on current account (k2); capital account transactions (k3); and 
a variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4). k3 is the one often used for capital 
controls. In 1996, the classification method in the AREAER changed and these four categories became more 
disaggregated as an effort to reflect the complexity of capital controls policies.  
13 This issue is somewhat alleviated by the recent disaggregation in the AREAER of the k3 category into 13 
subcategories. Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) created the time series of capital controls based on the new 13 
disaggregated components in the AREAER. However, their data series are not sufficiently long; it only covers years 
after 1996. Most recently, Miniane (2004) constructed a set of indices to measure the intensity of capital controls, 
based on an approach akin to Johnston et al., but extending the data back to 1983 for 34 countries.    8 
often refer to financial integration among countries and interpret it as de facto restrictions on 
capital transactions (See De Gregorio (1998) and Rajan (2003)). 
In this study, we rely upon the capital account openness index, KAOPEN developed by 
Chinn and Ito (2002). This index is the first principle component of the four IMF binary variables 
discussed above.
14 One of the merits of the KAOPEN index is that it attempts to measure the 
intensity of capital controls, insofar as the intensity is correlated with the existence of other 
restrictions on international transactions. By the nature of its construction, one may argue that the 
KAOPEN index measures the extensity of capital controls because it may not directly refer to the 
stringency of restrictions on cross-border transactions, but to the existence of different types of 
restrictions. However, measuring the extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the 
measure of intensity of capital controls.
15 This point can be made more concrete by considering a 
country with an open capital account. It may still restrict the flow of capital by limiting 
transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange rates 
and requirements to surrender export proceeds. Alternatively, countries that already have closed 
capital accounts might try to increase the stringency of those controls by imposing other types of 
restrictions (such as restrictions on current account and requirements for surrender of trade 
proceeds) so that the private sector cannot circumvent the capital account restrictions. Another 
merit of this index is its wide coverage (more than 100 countries) for a long time period (1970 
through 2000).
16 Appendix 2 explains how KAOPEN is constructed. 
Table 2 presents the averages of KAOPEN and IMF binary variables for the full sample 
period of 1970 – 2000 and each decade. Not surprisingly, the group of industrialized countries 
have maintained a high level of capital account openness over the full sample period while 
emerging market countries seem to have slightly more open capital accounts than less developed 
                                                            
14 For the extension of the four binary classifications after 1996, we followed Mody and Murshid (2005). 
15 One might think of the Quinn (1997) index as the measure of the intensity of capital controls. The Quinn index is a 
composite measure of financial regulation that ranges from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most 
open regime. The bulk of the index is based upon Quinn’s coding of the qualitative information contained in the 
AREAER pertaining to k2 and k3, augmented by information regarding whether the country in question has entered into 
international agreements with international organizations such as the OECD and EU. A complete tabulation for the 
OECD members exists, but the coverage for the less developed countries is much less extensive. The correlation 
between the Quinn index and the Chinn-Ito index is found to be 83.9%, suggesting that KAOPEN is proxying the 
intensity of capital controls. The correlation between the aforementioned index by Miniane (2004), which is based on 
more disaggregated AREAER information on capital controls, and the Chinn-Ito index is found to be 80.2%.  
16 The Quinn index is available for the OECD members between 1958 and 1997, but the coverage for the less 
developed countries is limited to certain years (1958, 1973, 1982, 1988, and 1997).     9 
countries.
17 Interestingly, both industrialized and emerging market countries achieved much more 
rapid financial liberalization between the 1980s and 1990s than less developed countries, 
especially making the difference between emerging market and less developed countries in capital 
account openness become quite large by the 1990s. 
2.2.3 Measures of Legal/Institutional Development  
The legal/institutional variables can be categorized into two groups. The first group 
contains the measures related to the general development of legal systems and institutions, namely 
LEGAL1, Corrupt, LAO, and BQ. LEGAL1 is the first principal component of the other three 
variables, and we treat this variable as a representative measure of the general level of 
legal/institutional development.
18 Corrupt, LAO, and BQ measure the level of corruption, law and 
order, and the quality of the bureaucratic system, respectively. All of these data series included in 
LEGAL1 are obtained from the ICRG database. In these indexes, higher values indicate better 
conditions. The data series are available for the period of 1984 through 1997, but are included as 
the period-average in order to maintain comparability with the LEGAL2 variables. The summary 
statistics for the LEGAL1 variables are reported in Table 3. In the table, we can observe that the 
wide gap in the level of legal and institutional development between industrialized and less 
developed countries, and also that emerging market countries have achieved a higher level of legal 
development within the group of less developed countries. 
The second group of legal variables – CREDITOR, ENFORCE, SHRIGHTS, and 
ACCOUNT – pertain specifically to financial transactions, and are obtained from LLSV (1998). 
CREDITOR refers to the level of creditor protection, while ENFORCE is an index of the 
effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts. SHRIGHTS is a measure of shareholder 
protection, and ACCOUNT is an index of the comprehensiveness of company reports. LEGAL2 is 
the first standardized principal component of the four variables, and therefore depicts the overall 
development of the legal system governing financial transactions.
19 The summary statistics for 
these LEGAL2 variables are reported in Table 4. 
Before discussing the results, we make the following two observations. The first pertains to 
the temporal nature of these institutional variables. Although we use panel data specifications in 
                                                            
17 The cross-sectional average of KAOPEN for the full sample period is zero by construction. 
18 The first eigenvector for LEGAL1 was found to be (Corrupt, LAO,BQ)’ = (0.574, 0.580, 0.578)’, indicating that the 
variability of LEGAL1 is not merely driven by any particular series. 
19 The first eigenvector for LEGAL2 was found to be (Creditor, Enforce, Shrights, Account)’ = (0.206, 0.670, 0.095,   10 
the following analyses, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, 
i.e., they are time-invariant. However, the inclusion of these time-invariant factors do not pose a 
substantial problem for our analysis, since these characteristics represented by the 
legal/institutional variables are likely to change only very slowly.
20 Moreover, we focus mainly on 
the effect of financial openness on financial development, but not the effect of legal/institutional 
development per se. In other words, rather than shedding light on how the development of 
institutions and legal systems affects financial development, we examine how the effect of 
financial openness changes depending upon the “environment” of institutions and legal systems. 
Therefore, time-variation of the legal/institutional variables is not critical to our study. 
The second issue is sample size. While the original panel encompasses 108 countries, the 
data set based on LLSV spans less than 50 countries.
21  There is minimal impact on the coverage of 
the industrialized countries, but the size of the LDC sample is substantially reduced. 
Consequently, our LDC sample in this portion of the analysis essentially becomes the emerging 
market group previously defined.
22  Hence, for the regressions with the first group of 
legal/institutional variables (i.e., LEGAL1, Corrupt, LAO, and BQ), we will present results for the 
full sample and the subsamples for less developed countries (LDC) and emerging market countries 
(EMG) whereas for those with the second group of legal variables, we report results for the full 
sample and a subset titled the “LDC/EMG” category, which is mainly composed of EMG 
countries. 
2.3  Empirical Results 
The regression results for the model specified in equation (1) are reported in Tables 5-1 
through 5-4. We focus on the coefficients of KAOPENt-5 (first row), the legal variable (second 
row), and the interactive term between the legal variable and KAOPENt-5 (third row). Our 
observations will mainly focus on the regressions with equity market development measures and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
0.707)’. 
20 Stulz (1999) and Stiglitz (2000) argue that financial globalization puts pressure on governments to improve legal 
systems and infrastructure for financial markets. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence for the 
causality. Also, as previously mentioned, the ICRG legal variables are available since 1984, which also creates 
practical data constraints for us to use time-varying variables for legal and institutional development. 
21  More specifically, the data set contains LEGAL data for 38 countries, CREDITOR for 46 countries, ENFORCE for 
48 countries, SHRIGHTS for 47 countries, and ACCOUNT for 40 countries. 
22  The LLSV cross-sectional data set used for this paper includes only three countries which are not either 
industrialized or emerging market countries by our definition.    11 
especially those of less developed and emerging market countries.
23 
Table 5-1 reports the regression results for the models with LEGAL1. We can see that when 
the regressions are controlled for the general development of legal systems and institutions 
(LEGAL1), financial openness (KAOPENt-5) contributes to financial development in equity 
markets, measured by stock market total values, in both LDC and EMG subsamples. In these 
models, the interactive effect between financial openness and legal development is also detected. 
Significant coefficients for the interactive term are also found in the models with other measures of 
equity market development for both LDC and EMG subsamples. However, we must be careful 
about how to interpret the overall effect of capital account openness because it depends on the 
level of legal development.
24 That is, given equation (1), the total effect of financial openness can 
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where L is the mean of a measure of legal development. For example, when we examine the 
regression specifications for the financial development measured in stock market total value for 
LDC and EMG groups in Table 5-1 (columns [7] and [11]), the total effect of a one-unit increase in 
KAOPEN is calculated to be –0.0006 for less developed countries and 0.005 for emerging market 
countries if we use each subsample’s average of LEGAL1, –0.74 for the former group and –0.28 
for the latter. Thus, although the estimated coefficients for KAOPEN and the interaction terms are 
not significantly different between LDC and EMG groups, the difference in the general level of 
legal and institutional development makes the effect of KAOPEN on equity market development 
quite different between the subsample groups; while opening capital accounts, on average, leads to 
a lower rate of development in equity markets among less developed countries, it leads to a more 
rapid rate of equity market development for emerging market countries. As another example, Peru, 
an emerging market country in our sample, increased its financial openness level from –1.84 to 
2.27 between 1990 and 1995. Given its LEGAL1 level of –1.65, the increase in financial openness 
                                                            
23 The definition of emerging market countries relies upon the International Financial Corporation’s (IFC) indices. 
The group of emerging market countries in this study refers to the countries which were included in either IFC’s 
Global, Investible, or Frontier Index as of 1995. By this definition, there are 31 EMG countries in our sample. 
However, as has been mentioned previously, for the regressions with the LEGAL2 (financial legal) variables, because 
of data availability, there is no distinction between LDC and EMG, but there is a subgroup LDC/EMG. 
24 In case of the regressions with LEGAL1, the fact that the variable can be negative for a lower value (see Table 3) also 
contributes to the complexity in the interpretation.   12 
would reduce the growth rate of stock market total value by 4.1% point annually. Argentina, 
another EMG country, experienced a smaller increase of 3.15 in its KAOPEN variable (from –1.16 
to 2.00), but because its LEGAL1 level is –0.175, higher than Peru’s, its SMTV is predicted to grow 
at an additional 1.9% annually. Given that SMTV grew at 3.00% annually for emerging market 
countries during the 1990s (Table 1), this acceleration in the growth rate is significant. Thus, 
opening capital accounts can be effective for financial development only if a country has attained a 
threshold level of legal and institutional development. 
Table 6 makes this point clear. In this table, row [A] shows the total effect of a one-unit 
increase in KAOPEN calculated using the estimates from the regression model with stock market 
total value for the subsample of less developed countries, evaluated at the average values of the 
legal variable for LDC and EMG (shown in row [B]). Row [C] shows the threshold level of the 
legal variable, above which a one-unit increase in capital account openness has a positive impact 
on equity market development. Thus we can conclude that, in order for capital account openness to 
contribute to the development of equity markets, countries must be possessed of a level of  
legal/institutional development greater than LEGAL1 = –0.68. Hence, emerging market countries 
(whose average value of LEGAL1 –0.28 exceeds the  –0.68 threshold), will on average benefit 
from opening their capital accounts. On the other hand, less developed countries will hamper their 
equity market development by opening capital accounts. In our dataset, Tunisia has a value of 
LEGAL1 closest to the threshold level (its value is –0.683). The countries marginally above the 
threshold level include India and Morocco (–0.561 and –0.566, respectively) among others, while 
those closely below include Mexico and Iran (–0.793 and –0.738, respectively) among others.  
Figure 1 depicts this clear difference in the correlation between capital account openness and 
equity market development. The upper scatter diagram (a) shows the relationship between the 
five-year change in the KAOPEN level five years prior to the time period (i.e., change between 
t-10 and t-5) and the level change in SMTV between t-5 and the contemporary time period (t) for 
the countries whose LEGAL1 value is above the threshold level, while diagram (b) is for those with 
lower LEGAL1 variables than the threshold. Not surprisingly, we can observe that, for the 
countries with above-threshold levels of general legal or institutional development, KAOPEN and 
SMTV have a positive relationship. For the countries with below-threshold levels of legal 
development, there is no discernable relationship between capital account opening and equity 
market development. Also, in these countries, equity markets appear to be far from active   13 
regardless of the degree of financial liberalization. 
Table 5-2 summarizes the results from the regressions that are run with each of the 
components of LEGAL1 (i.e., Corrupt, LAO, and BQ) included individually and interactively. For 
the sake of brevity, the table shows only the coefficients of the financial openness variable, the 
legal/institutional variable, and the interaction term. Across the different models with different 
measures of financial development, the significance of the estimated coefficients appears to be 
qualitatively the same as those of the regressions with LEGAL1. Table 6, again, helps our 
interpretation of the overall effect of KAOPEN for the models with SMTV. Generally, we can 
surmise that liberalizing capital accounts may lead to development in equity markets only when 
the measures against corruption or law and order are higher than the threshold levels (52.2 and 
54.5, respectively). In other words, their measures need to be as well-established as in emerging 
market countries in order to reap the benefit of capital account liberalization. When we control for 
the level of bureaucratic quality, financial openness seems to leads to financial development 
among both less developed and emerging market countries (because of both subsample groups’ 
higher average values than the threshold level), but its effect is higher for the latter group. 
Interestingly, we can observe that the coefficient of KAOPENt-5 alone has a negative sign wherever 
the interactive term has a significant coefficient, suggesting that opening financial markets alone 
may lead to underdevelopment of equity markets, but it can be avoided only if the countries are 
equipped with a reasonable level of legal/institutional development.  
When we focus on the effect of legal development relating particularly to financial 
transactions (LEGAL2 and LLSV variables), the findings are not as decisive as in the previous 
cases (results shown in Tables 5-3 and 5-4).
25 Using LEGAL2 as the legal/institutional variable 
(Table 5-3) in the LDC/EMG subgroup, its interactive effect with LEGAL2, and the LEGAL2 level 
term are significant in the determination of the development in stock market total value. Table 6 
shows that the total effect of financial openness is positive on average in the LDC/EMG subgroup 
(i.e., the subgroup’s average level of legal development is higher than the threshold level). In other 
models for the LDC/EMG subgroup, however, neither financial openness nor its interactive term 
seems to affect banking or equity market development in a significant fashion. 
Among the components of the financial legal development variable (LEGAL2), shown in 
                                                            
25 As previously discussed, due to the data availability of the LLSV variables, there is only one subsample for 
non-industrialized countries, which we call LDC/EMG.   14 
Table 5-4 (which again only shows the coefficients of interest), the level of creditor protection 
seems to be an important factor for financial development in both banking and equity sectors while 
no interactive effect is detected. When contract enforcement is used as the legal/institutional 
variable, in all models with equity market development, we can detect a positive interactive effect 
and a negative solo effect of the level of financial openness.
26 Among the models with shareholder 
protection, the level of share holder protection seems to matter for stock market capitalization 
while the level of financial openness contributes to stock market turnover. The models using 
accounting standards as the legal/institutional measure do not indicate any effect of financial 
openness on financial development.  
Our findings suggest that in order for financial openness to help develop equity markets, the 
level of legal and institutional development is crucial. If a country tries to develop its equity 
markets while it is not equipped with well-developed legal systems or institutions, opening capital 
accounts may even harm the development of equity markets. Also, we find that it is the 
development of general legal systems and institutions, not of those specific to financial 
transactions, that is crucial for a country to benefit from opening its financial markets.  
2.4  Robustness Checks 
Here, we examine whether our baseline results are sensitive to outliers. Concerns about the 
impact of outliers flows from two issues. First, in addition to the usual measurement error present 
in macroeconomic data, it is likely that the data for financial development is subject to even greater 
measurement errors. Second, these financial development indicators may unintentionally capture 
financial bubbles, although the use of five year changes may serve to mitigate this concern. As a 
point of reference, it is useful to note that in many studies of lending booms as financial crises 
indicators, changes in lending or stock market sizes over a shorter window, of between 2 to 4 years 
are, often used.
27 Nonetheless, we investigate whether the regression results are being distorted by 
data outliers. In order to conserve space, we merely summarize the results and our observations 
below. 
First, using the original annual data, we exclude the observations of financial development 
variables if their annual growth rates are two standard deviations away from the mean in both 
                                                            
26 The patterns of the significance of the coefficients are no coincidence. By construction, the components of 
ENFORCE are closest to LEGAL1 variables as shown in data appendix. 
27  See Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Chinn, Dooley and Shrestha (1999), Kaminsky (2003), Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001b), and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).   15 
directions, and re-estimate the same sets of regressions.
28  The exclusion of outliers shrinks the 
observation size by a relatively small degree, about 0 – 11%.
29 Generally, in the re-estimated 
results (not reported), the magnitude of the estimated coefficients often becomes smaller, but so do 
the standard errors, especially for the models with stock market related measures for the LDC and 
EMG subgroups. Therefore, not only does the statistical significance of the coefficients remain 
qualitatively unchanged, but in addition some of the coefficients which were previously 
insignificant become significant.  
Interestingly, in many models the adjusted R-squared increases. This is most apparent in the 
models with LEGAL2 and ACCOUNT. In this analysis for the LDC/EMG group, the coefficient of 
LEGAL2 is now significant for the model with SMKC, and both the KAOPEN variable and the 
interactive term are statistically negative and positive, respectively, for the models with SMKC and 
SMTV. The same exercise is then repeated, but increasing the range of outlier exclusion by 
dropping the observations if their annual growth rates are larger than one and a half standard 
deviations away from the mean in both directions. This exclusion shrinks the sample size quite 
substantially (sometimes as much as 40%), although the results are largely unchanged. The fit and 
the significance of the coefficients even improves for the models for the LDC/EMG with LEGAL2 
and ACCOUNT. Two conclusions flow from this exercise. First, the key findings of the analysis 
are not driven by outliers. Second, some of the findings related to the legal/institutional variables 
could have even been obscured by the effects of outliers.  
2.5  Reverse Causality? 
One may reasonably ask if financial development is what allows countries to implement 
financial liberalization policy, rather than the reverse. While we have worked with 
non-overlapping, five-year window panels in order to mitigate problems associated with 
simultaneity, it may still be worthwhile to investigate whether countries need to develop their 
financial systems before undertaking capital account liberalization. Conversely, if we can show 
that reverse causality is irrelevant, that will be evidence that countries can develop their financial 
markets by exogenously deciding to open their financial markets. 
                                                            
28  Since we are dealing with a set of non-overlapping five year panels, in essence the only data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 
1995, and 2000 are affected by the removal of outliers. 
29 Exclusion of the outliers takes place more for the models with stock market total value and stock market turnover 
than those with private credit creation and stock market capitalization, which reflects that the former group are more 
subject to market volatility than the latter. The rate of exclusion is generally higher for the subgroup of emerging   16 
To explore the above question, we change the specification in equation (1) by exchanging 
the places of KAOPENt-5 and financial development measures (PCGDP, SMKC, SMTV, and 
SMTO); the left-hand side variable is now the five-year average growth in KAOPEN while the 
independent variables of our focus now becomes the financial development variable and the 
interactive terms between the legal/institutional variables and the financial development variables. 
We run regressions specified as follows, using non-overlapping data and including each of the 
legal/institutional variables: 














t X FD L L FD KAOPEN KAOPEN KAOPEN n f f f j f + F + ´ + + + + = - - - - - - . 
The coefficient of our interest is  1 f ; A significantly positive  1 f  would indicate that the above OLS 
regression results entail simultaneous causality, i.e., financial development leads to financial 
openness. The regression results (not reported) show that across the regressions with different 
financial development measures as well as legal/institutional variables, the coefficients,  1 f ’s, are 
mostly statistically insignificant or significantly negative, either of which is against the null 
hypothesis that financial development leads to financial openness. The significantly negative  1 f ’s 
are found in the regressions that have the dependent variable of the equity market development 
measures. One of the possible explanations for the negative  1 f  may be that a rapid growth in 
equity markets, in terms of the size of the markets (SMKC) or the liquidity of the markets (SMTV 
or SMTO) is sometimes associated with financial crises, and that policy makers lower the degree of 
financial openness during periods of crisis (Ito, 2004). At the very least, we can conclude that our 
estimation results are not subject to obvious simultaneity issues (as in Bekaert, et al.,2001).  
 
3.  Investigating the Sequence of Liberalization  
 
3.1  Trade and Capital Account Liberalization 
One suggestive result we must discuss is the frequent finding of statistically significant and 
positive coefficients on the trade openness variable in the above estimation results based on 
equation (2).
30 To the extent that our trade openness variable reflects trade liberalization, our 
results are germane to the question if trade openness is a precondition for financial opening. This is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
market countries for the same reason.   17 
the optimal sequence question, which has been raised by many, including McKinnon (1991). In 
fact, liberalization in goods markets is often claimed to be a precondition for financial 
liberalization policy (Tornell et al., 2004).  
We empirically explore this hypothesis by employing a simple model that accounts for the 
determinants of financial openness or restrictions. As stated in equation (3), we model financial 
openness is the function of government budget surplus, international reserves, trade openness, and 
per capita GDP.
31  
(3)   t t t t t t Z TradeOpen KAOPEN KAOPEN n x x x + X + + + = - - - - 5 | 1 5 2 5 1 0 , 
where Zt-1|t-5 is a vector of macroeconomic control variables, namely, government budget surplus, 
international reserves, and per capita GDP.
32 The rationale for using these macro variables follows 
the past literature. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) showed that a higher level of restrictions on 
capital flows is empirically linked to higher rates of inflation, a higher share of seigniorage in total 
taxes, lower real interest rates, and a higher share of government consumption in GDP. Their 
finding implies that capital controls appear to have strong fiscal implications, i.e., countries with a 
less developed tax system tend to implement capital controls as the source of government revenue 
as well as the remedy to capital flows caused by the inflation-driven distortions in the financial 
markets. In investigating the empirical determinants of capital controls, Johnston and Tamirisa 
(1998) find that countries tend to implement capital controls, the more prevalent the balance of 
payments concerns are, the higher real interest rates and real exchange rates,
33 and the larger the 
size of the government deficit as a share of GDP. We select two variables – the government budget 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30 Again, due to space considerations, the regression results are not reported. They are available upon request. 
31 The empirical model also controls for regional differences by regional dummies. In Glick, Guo and Hutchison 
(2004), an empirical model of capital account liberalization is proposed. Our set of explanatory variables overlaps, but 
does not match, theirs. In part the difference arises from their more empirically oriented motivation for model 
selection.  
32 The variable for gross international reserves is a proxy to the balance of payments situation of the countries and is 
measured by gross international reserves in months of imports. The lower gross reserves in months of imports, the 
higher prevalence of balance of payments concerns are. The data are extracted from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Others have used international reserves as a ratio to M2 as a proxy to the balance of payments 
situation. The regression results shown in this paper are qualitatively unchanged if international reserves as a ratio to 
M2 are used. 
33  Their theoretical prediction, which contrasts with that of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, is that countries use capital 
controls to pursue inconsistent internal and external balances simultaneously such as the case where outflow controls 
are implemented to avoid nominal currency deprecation pressures without tightening of monetary conditions. When 
such a threat of currency crisis arises, the real interest rates or real exchange rates tends to be higher. See Leblang 
(1997) for more discussions on the determinants of capital controls.   18 
surplus and international reserves – since they are most commonly argued as the determinants of 
capital controls.
34 We also include per capita GDP to control for the level of development of the 
economic system. Since these variables are supposed to control for the general trend of macro 
variables, they are included as the 5-year average prior to the time period t (as shown as (t-1|t-5) in 
the regression results table). 
With these macro variables, we test whether trade openness is a precondition for financial 
opening by including a five-year lagged variable for the trade openness measure. Although we 
used in the previous analyses, opn, the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, as the trade 
openness variable, we use a different variable to measure openness in trade flows. By construction, 
the variable opn measures the openness in good transactions in terms of not only economic factors 
but also regulatory measures such as tariffs and quotas. As such, we use another variable 
TRADEOPEN which is a reciprocal of the duties imposed on both imports and exports.
35  
In order to minimize the possibility of two-way causality, we employ a non-overlapping 
panel data analysis as we did in previous analyses. While the macro variables are included as the 
five-year average, both KAOPEN and TRADEOPEN are included as the initial conditions of each 
five-year panel. In the empirical analysis, we focus on the coefficient  2 x  to see if the openness in 
goods trade can be a precondition for financial opening. 
The first three columns of Table 7 report the regressions results. While the average budget 
surplus and GDP per capita enter significantly, but not international reserves, the trade openness 
variable seems to contribute to the level of financial openness in the full sample and the subsample 
for the less developed countries, indicating that the openness in goods transactions is a 
precondition for financial openness. Columns (4) through (6) of Table 7 show the results when we 
switch the places for KAOPEN and TRADEOPEN in the regression, in order to see whether the 
reverse causality also holds.
36 We can see that in both the full sample and the subsamples, the 
                                                            
34 In addition to the above variables, we attempted to include variables that refer to the government engagement in 
seigniorage, such as the inflation rate or the reserve ratio. However, these measures of seigniorage can cause 
multicollinearity in regression analysis due to its correlation with the level of government budget surplus, the reverse 
of which is often the reason for seigniorage. Therefore, we decided not to include seigniorage-related variables in our 
regression model. 
35 Import and export duties as a ratio to imports and exports, respectively, are available from the World Bank’s WDI. 
The weighted average of these variables is calculated using the share of imports and exports in total trade and then 
subtracted from 100 to show the openness. Hence, the higher (or close to 100) TRADEOPEN is, the less duties 
imposed on trade flows in both directions, i.e., the more open trade flows are by regulation. Note the variable is 
included in log form. 
36 The variable for international reserves is not retained because it lacks a theoretical motivation.    19 
financial openness variable does not enter significantly. Hence, we can safely conclude that the 
more openness in goods transactions can lead to a more openness in capital account, but the 
reverse causality does not appear to be present, a result consistent with Tornell et al. (2004).  
3.2 Endogeneity and the Sequence of Liberalization 
Taking our cue from the results reported above, we implement two stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation instrumenting the KAOPENt-5 variable in equation (1) with the initial conditions 
of financial and trade openness five years prior to the variable (i.e., 10-year lagged), as well as 
government budget surplus and GDP per capita as the five-year average prior to t-5 and regional 
dummies.
37 If we can detect the effect of financial openness on financial development, we can 
present evidence that financial opening which is preceded by trade opening leads to financial 
development in a model where the level of legal/institutional development is controlled for. 
The results of applying 2SLS to a model that controls for the general development level of 
legal systems and institutions (LEGAL1) are reported in Table 8. For the group of less developed 
countries, we can see that both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients for the models with stock market capitalization (SMKC) and stock market total value 
(SMTV) increase. For the SMKC, the levels of both legal development and financial openness seem 
to be significant contributors to equity market development. When financial development is 
measured by stock market total value, in addition to the level effects of both financial openness 
and legal development, the interactive effect between the two is also identified. Similar results are 
also found in the group of emerging market countries. Given these results, we may conclude that 
financial opening succeeding trading opening leads to equity market development especially when 
it takes place in an economy with a reasonably developed legal system. 
 
4.  Interactions of Banks and Equity Markets  
In this section, we investigate two questions. The first is whether the development of a 
banking sector a precondition for the development of an equity market? Second, does the 
development of one sector substitute or complement development in another?  
 
                                                            
37 The international reserves variable is not included because of its insignificance in the previous analysis.    20 
4.1  Sequencing in Financial Development 
We modify the basic regression model of equation (1) by adding a new term: the level of 
financial development in the alternative mode. For the regressions with equity market 
development, the initial level of banking development, private credit creation (PCGDP), in each 
five-year panel is included in the regression model whereas the initial level of equity market 
development, measured as stock market capitalization (SMKC), is included in the regressions for 
banking development as a comparison. The new equation is now: 
(4)   ( )
                                                                                                 5 5 0
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where OtherFin refers to PCGDP for the regressions on equity market development and to SMKC 
for the regression with PCGDP. As with the basic model, the regression is repeated for each of the 
financial development measures as the dependent variable and using different legal/institutional 
variables. Given the results from the previous section, we will only use the legal/institutional 
variables from the LEGAL1 group. 
The regression results are summarized in Table 9. This table contains only the estimated 
coefficients for OtherFint-5 ( 0 l ). While SMKCt-5 never enters significantly for the models on 
banking development in both the full sample and the subsamples, the coefficient for PCGDPt-5 is 
always significantly positive in the models with SMKC and SMTV for the LDC subsample with all 
the legal/institutional variables. These results suggest that banking development is an important 
precondition for the development in equity markets among less developed countries, while, as 
expected, the development in equity markets does not seem to be a precondition for banking 
development in any countries. 
4.2  Complements or Substitutes?  
We now investigate the question of whether banking and equity markets are complements or 
substitutes. To do so, we make only one modification to the previous empirical model. Instead of 





t OtherFD OtherFD 5 - -  which  is  the  five-year  average  growth  of  financial  development  in 
another sector.    21 
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As in the previous analysis, the regressions on equity market development includes the 




t OtherFD OtherFD 5 - -  and  those  with  PCGDP 
includes  the  five-year  average  growth  of  SMKC.  The  estimator  of  our  focus  is  now 0 t ;  a 
significantly positive (negative) coefficient estimate indicates that developments in equity and 
banking sectors are complements (substitutes).  
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t PCGDP PCGDP 5 - -  in the SMKC 




t SMKC SMKC 5 - -  in the PCGDP model are significantly positive. This means that 
for the group of less developed countries, the development in banking sector and that in equity 
markets are complementary to each other. Given the results in the previous section, while less 
developed countries may  well be able to develop their financial markets by opening capital 
account  if  it  is  equipped  with  a  reasonable  level  of  legal/institutional  development,  banking 
development and equity market development seem to have synergistic effects.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
We began our empirical investigation by examining the nexus between capital account 
liberalization and financial development. Our key empirical results suggest that financial openness 
does contribute to equity market development, but only when a threshold level of general 
development of legal systems and institutions has been attained. Financial development – 
measured as activity of the stock market – appears to depend upon capital account openness both 
individually and in interaction with the level of legal development. Interestingly, finance-specific 
legal institutions do not seem to fulfill the same role. Hence, we conclude that the general level of 
legal development matters more than the level of finance-specific legal/institutional development. 
These results are robust to the presence of outliers in the data and simultaneity.  
We also obtain a series of other results. First, we find that the opening of goods markets is a 
precondition for financial opening. When the financial openness variable is instrumented with 
trade openness, the contribution of the general level of legal development still remains significant.   22 
This finding could be interpreted as evidence that an increase in trade openness is a prolog to 
financial openness, and thence to financial development. 
Second, using a specification that controls for the level of legal and institutional 
development, we show that the development of the banking sector is a precondition for the 
development in equity markets. Finally, developments in less developed country banking and 
equity markets have interacting effects that work in both directions. 
   23 
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Appendix 1: Data Definition and Sources 
Key to abbreviations: 
BDL: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). 
IFS: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
LLSV: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
Mody: Personal communication from Ashok Mody, data based on AREAER 
PWT: Penn World Table 6.1.  
WDI: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
ICRG: International Country Risk Guide  
 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
current – Current account balance as a ratio to GDP, 
WDI 
opn – openness to trade, (nominal exports plus 
imports)/nominal GDP 
exports –  national currency (from national account, 
90c), IFS 
imports – national currency (from national account, 
98c), IFS 
impduty – import duty as a ratio to imports, WDI 
expduty – export duty as a ratio to exports, WDI 
tradeopen – the weighted average of impduty and 
expduty calculated using the share of imports and 
exports in total trade and then subtracted from 100. The 
higher (or close to 100) tradeopen is, the less duties 
imposed on trade flows in both directions. 
totalreserve – international reserves in months of 
imports, WDI 
reserve_m2 – international reserves as a ratio to M2, IFS 
rypc = per capital real income in constant international 
dollars, PWT 
cpi – Consumer price index (64), IFS 
infl – Inflation rate calculated using log differences of 
CPIs (64), IFS 
gsur – government budget surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a 




idc – equals one if industrialized country, and zero, 
otherwise (See the list of countries) 
emg – equals one if emerging market country, and zero, 
otherwise (See the list of countries) 
asia – dummy for Asian countries 
africa – dummy for African countries 
westhem – dummy for the countries in the west 
hemisphere  
europe – dummy for European countries 
mideast – dummy for Middle East countries 
 
Financial Development Indicators 
lly – Liquid Liability to GDP (LLY), currency demand 
and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other 
financial intermediaries divided by GDP, BDL 
SMKC – stock market capitalization ratio to GDP, BDL 
SMTV – stock market total value traded to GDP, BDL 
SMTO – stock market turn over ratio, BDL 
PCGDP – Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to 
GDP, BDL 
m2y – Ratio of M2 to nominal GDP, IFS 
 
 
Capital Controls Indicators 
k1 – multiple exchange rates, Mody 
k2 – restrictions on CA trans, Mody 
k3 – restrictions on KA trans, Mody 
k4 – surrender of exports proceeds, Mody 
SHAREk3 – Share of a five-year period, the observed 
year and the last four years, when the capital account 
was open. Authors’ calculations 
KAOPEN – index for openness to capital account 
transactions.  The first standardized principal 
components of k1, k2, SHAREk3, and k4. Authors’ 
calculations. 
quinn – Quinn financial liberalization indicator, Quinn.  
miniane – Miniane (2004) index on capital controls 
 
Legal Institutional Variables 
LEGAL1 – legal index, the first principal component of 
Corrupt, LAO, and BQ. 
Corrupt – average of corruption in 1984 – 1997. 
LAO – average of Laworder in 1984 – 1997. 
BQ – average of BQ in 1984 – 1997. 
corruption – corruption index, ICRG. 
lawoder – index for Law and order, ICRG.   28 
bureauc – index for bureaucratic quality, ICRG. 
LEGAL2 – legal index, the first principal component of 
credit, enforce, shrights, and account, cross-sectional for 
37 countries, LLSV 
credit – index of creditor protection, composed of the 
variables which incorporate the automatic stay 
proposition on the assets of a failing firm (“noauto”); 
the continuation of the old managers in a reorganization 
process (“manages”); restrictions for going into 
reorganization (“restorg”); and the seniority system of 
secured creditors (“secured1”), cross-sectional for 
44countries, LLSV 
enforce – index of the degree of law enforcement. 
Specifically, it is the average of “judsys” (efficiency of 
the judicial system), “rulelaw” (rule of law), “riskEx” 
(risk of expropriation), and “contrepu” (risk of contract 
repudiation), average over period 1982 – 1995, 
cross-sectional for 46 countries, LLSV 
shrights – the sum of “oneshvt” (one share-one vote), 
“bymail” (proxy by mail allowed), “noblock” (shares 
not blocked before meeting), “comulvt” (cumulative 
voting/proportional representation), “oppdmnty” 
(oppressed minority), “premprt” (preemptive right to 
new issues), and “esm” (% of share capital to call an 
emergency shareholder meeting < 10%), cross-sectional 
for 46 countries, LLSV  
account – index of transparency and 
comprehensiveness of companies’ (accounting) reports, 
based on data in 1990, cross-sectional for 38 countries, 
LLSV 
 
cn – IMF country code, see the country list 
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Country list (108 countries)   
1  612  DZA  Algeria  
2  213  ARG  Argentina 
e 
3  193  AUS  Australia 
i  
4  122  AUT  Austria 
i  
5  313  BHS  Bahamas, The 
6  419  BHR  Bahrain, Kingdom of 
e 
7  513  BGD  Bangladesh 
e 
8  316  BRB  Barbados  
9  124  BEL  Belgium 
i  
10  339  BLZ  Belize  
11  638  BEN  Benin  
12  218  BOL  Bolivia  
13  616  BWA  Botswana 
e 
14  223  BRA  Brazil 
e 
15  748  BFA  Burkina Faso  
16  618  BDI  Burundi  
17  622  CMR  Cameroon  
18  156  CAN  Canada 
i  
19  626  CAF  Central African Rep.  
20  628  TCD  Chad  
21  228  CHL  Chile 
e 
22  924  CHN  China 
e 
23  233  COL  Colombia 
e 
24  634  COG  Congo, Republic of  
25  238  CRI  Costa Rica  
26  662  CIV  Cote d' Ivoire 
e 
27  423  CYP  Cyprus  
28  128  DNK  Denmark 
i  
29  243  DOM  Dominican Republic  
30  248  ECU  Ecuador 
e 
31  469  EGY  Egypt 
e 
32  253  SLV  El Salvador  
33  819  FJI  Fiji  
34  172  FIN  Finland 
i  
35  132  FRA  France 
i  
36  646  GAB  Gabon  
37  648  GMB  Gambia, The  
38  134  DEU  Germany 
i  
39  652  GHA  Ghana 
e 
40  174  GRC  Greece 
i, e 
41  258  GTM  Guatemala  
42  263  HTI  Haiti  
43  268  HND  Honduras  
44  532  HKG  Hong Kong 
e 
45  176  ISL  Iceland 
i 
46  534  IND  India 
e 
47  536  IDN  Indonesia 
e 
48  429  IRN  Iran, Islamic Rep. of  
49  178  IRL  Ireland 
i  
50  436  ISR  Israel 
e 
51  136  ITA  Italy 
i  
52  343  JAM  Jamaica 
e 
53  158  JPN  Japan 
i  
54  439  JOR  Jordan 
e 
55  664  KEN  Kenya 
e 
56  542  KOR  Korea 
e 
57  443  KWT  Kuwait 
58  666  LSO  Lesotho  
59  674  MDG  Madagascar  
60  676  MWI  Malawi  
61  548  MYS  Malaysia 
e 
62  678  MLI  Mali  
63  181  MLT  Malta  
64  682  MRT  Mauritania  
65  684  MUS  Mauritius 
e 
66  273  MEX  Mexico 
e 
67  686  MAR  Morocco 
e 
68  558  NPL  Nepal  
69  138  NLD  Netherlands 
i  
70  196  NZL  New Zealand 
i  
71  278  NIC  Nicaragua  
72  692  NER  Niger  
73  694  NGA  Nigeria 
e 
74  142  NOR  Norway 
i  
75  449  OMN  Oman 
e 
76  564  PAK  Pakistan 
e 
77  283  PAN  Panama  
78  853  PNG  Papua New Guinea  
79  288  PRY  Paraguay  
80  293  PER  Peru 
e 
81  566  PHL  Philippines 
e 
82  182  PRT  Portugal 
i, e 
83  714  RWA  Rwanda  
84  456  SAU  Saudi Arabia 
e   
85  722  SEN  Senegal  
86  718  SYC  Seychelles  
87  724  SLE  Sierra Leone  
88  576  SGP  Singapore 
e 
89  199  ZAF  South Africa 
e 
90  184  ESP  Spain 
i  
91  524  LKA  Sri Lanka 
e 
92  734  SWZ  Swaziland  
93  144  SWE  Sweden 
i  
94  146  CHE  Switzerland 
i  
95  463  SYR  Syrian Arab Republic  
96  738  TZA  Tanzania  
97  578  THA  Thailand 
e 
98  742  TGO  Togo  
99  369  TTO  Trinidad and Tobago 
e 
100  744  TUN  Tunisia 
e 
101  186  TUR  Turkey 
e 
102  746  UGA  Uganda  
103  112  GBR  United Kingdom 
i  
104  111  USA  United States 
i  
105  298  URY  Uruguay  
106  299  VEN  Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
e 
107  754  ZMB  Zambia  
108  698  ZWE  Zimbabwe 
e 
i – industrialized countries (IDC), 22 countries 
e – emerging market countries (EMG), 31 countries 
(Standard & Poor, 2000)  30 
Appendix 2:  The “Chinn-Ito” Index 
KAOPEN is an index to measure a country’s degree of capital account openness. The dataset 
encompasses the time period of 1970-2000 for 108 countries. For a complete list of the countries, 
see the attached country list. 
Construction of KAOPEN 
KAOPEN is based on the four binary dummy variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are to provide 
information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide cross-section 
of countries. These variables are: 
·  k1: variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates; 
·  k2: variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions; 
·  k3: variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and  
·  k4: variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. 
In order to focus on the effect of financial openness – rather than controls – we reverse the values of 
these binary variables, such that the variables are equal to one when the capital account restrictions 
are non-existent. Moreover, for controls on capital transitions (k3), we use the share of a five-year 
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Then we construct an index for capital “openness” (KAOPENt), which is the first standardized 
principal component of k1t, k2t SHAREk3, k4t. This index takes on higher values the more open the 
country is to cross-border capital transactions. By construction, the series has a mean of zero. The 
first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be (SHAREk3, k1, k2, k4)’ = (0.573, 0.273, 0.521, 
0.571)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is not merely driven by the SHAREk3 series. 
 
We incorporate the k1,t, k2,t, and k4,t variables in our KAOPEN variable instead of focusing on k3 
which refers to restrictions on capital account transactions. We believe the incorporation of k1,t, k2,t, 
and k4,t in this index allows us to more accurately capture the intensity of the capital controls. This 
point can be made more concrete by considering a country with an open capital account. It may still 
restrict the flow of capital by limiting transactions on the current account restrictions or other 
systems such as multiple exchange rates and requirements to surrender export proceeds. 
Alternatively, countries that already have closed capital accounts might try to increase the 
stringency of those controls by imposing k1, k2, and k4 types of restrictions so that the private sector 
cannot circumvent the capital account restrictions.  
 
Clearly, the measurement of the extent of capital account controls is a difficult enterprise. Many 
researchers have tried to capture the complexity of real-world capital controls, with varying 
degrees of success, and varying degrees of coverage. For reviews and comparisons of various 
measures on capital controls, refer to Edwards (2001), Edison et al. (2002) and Eichengreen 
(2002).    31 
Table 1: Growth rates of PCGDP, SMKC, SMTV, and SMTO 
1970 – 2000 and decades 
 
  Growth rates of 








  (PCGDP)  (SMKC)  (SMTV)  (SMTO) 
1970 – 2000 
Full  0.87%  1.93%  1.87%  2.47% 
IDC  1.74%  2.96%  3.67%  3.45% 
LDC  0.61%  1.32%  0.84%  1.87% 
EMG  0.91%  1.49%  1.09%  2.49% 
1970 – 1979 
Full  0.62%  0.47%  0.18%  0.35% 
IDC  0.77%  -0.22%  0.25%  -0.35% 
LDC  0.57%  1.70%  0.11%  1.85% 
EMG  0.70%  1.29%  0.09%  1.55% 
1980 – 1989 
Full  0.68%  1.52%  1.33%  1.98% 
IDC  1.99%  2.89%  2.25%  3.61% 
LDC  0.30%  0.53%  0.70%  0.78% 
EMG  0.49%  0.70%  0.82%  1.16% 
1990 – 2000 
Full  1.08%  3.33%  3.72%  3.81% 
IDC  1.95%  5.59%  7.51%  4.40% 
LDC  0.85%  2.27%  1.99%  3.53% 
EMG  1.35%  2.66%  3.00%  5.14% 
1995 – 2000 
Full  1.58%  3.03%  4.81%  5.08% 
IDC  3.10%  9.50%  12.06%  6.52% 
LDC  1.19%  0.25%  1.66%  4.45% 
EMG  1.78%  –0.39%  2.83%  7.30% 
Notes: For the data description, refer to section 2.2.1 as well as Appendix 1. The 
original data are extracted from the updated version of the Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, 
and Levine (2000) dataset. 
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Tale 2: Averages of KAOPEN, k1, k2 k3, and k4 
1970 – 2000 and decades 
 
  Averages of 
  KAOPEN  k1  k2  k3  k4 
1970 – 2000  
Full  0.000  0.796  0.501  0.311  0.258 
IDC  1.125  0.903  0.830  0.499  0.571 
LDC  -0.288  0.769  0.416  0.264  0.177 
EMG  -0.255  0.743  0.396  0.276  0.194 
1970 – 1979 
Full  -0.278  0.747  0.520  0.194  0.204 
IDC  0.257  0.795  0.763  0.216  0.390 
LDC  -0.424  0.735  0.457  0.188  0.156 
EMG  -0.547  0.709  0.405  0.202  0.084 
1980 – 1989 
Full  -0.296  0.758  0.458  0.212  0.196 
IDC  0.804  0.929  0.852  0.400  0.490 
LDC  -0.570  0.716  0.362  0.166  0.123 
EMG  -0.571  0.690  0.290  0.187  0.142 
1990 – 2000 
Full  0.485  0.862  0.564  0.524  0.376 
IDC  2.152  1.000  0.963  0.929  0.883 
LDC  0.069  0.827  0.463  0.422  0.247 
EMG  0.274  0.833  0.490  0.437  0.379 
1995 – 2000 
Full  0.679  0.895  0.546  0.474  0.452 
IDC  2.407  1.000  0.962  0.902  0.992 
LDC  0.241  0.868  0.440  0.364  0.314 
EMG  0.555  0.882  0.516  0.419  0.473 
Notes: KAOPEN is an index for the openness in capital account transactions and is the 
first standardized principal component of SHAREk3, k1, k2, and k4. k1 indicates the 
presence of multiple exchange rates; k2 indicates restrictions on current account 
transactions; k3 indicates restrictions on capital account transactions; and k4indicates the 
requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. In order to focus on the effect of 
financial openness – rather than controls – we reverse the values of these binary 
variables, such that the variables are equal to one when the capital account restrictions 
are non-existent. The first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be (SHAREk3, k1, k2, 
k4)’ = (0.573, 0.273, 0.521, 0.571)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is not 
merely driven by the SHAREk3 series. The average of KAOPEN across countries over the 
full time period is zero by construction. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on Legal1 variables 
 
    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Total  0.00  1.63  -2.93  3.06 
IDC  2.41  0.75  0.68  3.06 
LDC  -0.74  0.98  -2.93  1.76 
Legal1 
EMG  -0.28  0.98  -1.98  1.76 
Total  58.40  21.93  15.18  100.00 
IDC  88.27  10.94  62.80  100.00 
LDC  49.27  15.28  15.18  87.20 
Corrupt 
EMG  54.73  15.02  26.79  87.20 
Total  60.87  22.82  22.62  100.00 
IDC  93.63  8.83  68.75  100.00 
LDC  50.85  15.00  22.62  87.80 
LAO 
EMG  55.76  18.01  22.62  87.80 
Total  58.86  24.73  16.67  100.00 
IDC  92.26  13.77  57.89  100.00 
LDC  48.66  17.14  16.67  93.45 
BQ 
EMG  56.44  14.26  29.32  93.45 
Notes: LEGAL1 is the first principal component of Corrupt, LAO, 
BQ, indicating the general level of legal/institutional development. 
Corrupt, LAO, and BQ measure the level of corruption, law and 
order, and the quality of the bureaucratic system, respectively. All of 
these data series included in LEGAL1 are obtained from the ICRG 
database. In these indexes, higher values indicate better conditions. 
The data series are available for the period of 1984 through 1997, but 
are included as the period-average in order to maintain 
comparability with the LEGAL2 variables. The first eigenvector for 
Legal1 was found to be (Corrupt, LAO,BQ)’ = (0.574, 0.580, 
0.578)’, indicating that the variability of LEGAL1 is not merely 
driven by any particular series. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Legal2 variables 
 
    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Total  0.00   1.31   -2.71   1.89  
IDC  0.70   0.86   -1.59   1.89   Legal2 
LDC/EMG  -0.77   1.31   -2.71   1.77  
Total  2.30   1.38   0.00   4.00  
IDC  1.81   0.98   0.00   4.00  
Creditor 
protection 
LDC/EMG  2.72   1.54   0.00   4.00  
Total  7.52   1.85   4.38   9.99  
IDC  9.24   0.83   6.73   9.99  
Contract 
Enforcement 
LDC/EMG  6.18   1.19   4.38   9.18  
Total  2.45   1.28   0.00   5.00  
IDC  2.19   1.29   0.00   4.00  
Shareholder 
Protection 
LDC/EMG  2.65   1.26   1.00   5.00  
Total  6.08   1.36   2.40   8.30  
IDC  6.62   1.04   3.60   8.30  
Accounting 
Standards 
LDC/EMG  5.55   1.44   2.40   7.80  
Notes: LEGAL2 is the first standardized principal component of 
CREDITOR, ENFORCE, SHRIGHTS, and ACCOUNT, and depicts 
the overall development of the legal system governing financial 
transactions. CREDITOR refers to the level of creditor protection, 
while ENFORCE is an index of the effectiveness of the legal system in 
enforcing contracts. SHRIGHTS is a measure of shareholder 
protection, and ACCOUNT is an index of the comprehensiveness of 
company reports. This group of legal variables pertain specifically to 
financial transactions, and are obtained from LLSV (1998). The first 
eigenvector for Legal2 was found to be (Creditor, Enforce, Shrights, 
Account)’ = (0.206, 0.670, 0.095, 0.707)’. 
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Table 5-1: Financial Development, Financial Openness, and Legal/Institutional Development  
(LEGAL1: General Legal/Institutional Development) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC  EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Value  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Value  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Value  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL1             
 
 
Financial Openness [t-5]  (+)  0.0027  -0.0009  -0.0036  -0.0041  0.0004  0.0050  0.0070  0.0096  0.0028  0.0097  0.0081  0.0013 
    [0.0011]**  [0.0041]  [0.0031]  [0.0097]  [0.0013]  [0.0078]  [0.0042]*  [0.0123]  [0.0024]  [0.0070]  [0.0044]*  [0.0179] 
LEVEL: LEGAL1  (+)  0.0014  -0.0025  -0.004  -0.0047  0.0011  0.0126  0.0091  0.0048  0.0077  0.0177  0.0117  0.0098 
    [0.0010]  [0.0057]  [0.0051]  [0.0127]  [0.0014]  [0.0081]  [0.0053]*  [0.0186]  [0.0032]**  [0.0098]*  [0.0082]  [0.0277] 
INTERACTION: LEGAL1  (+)  0.0005  0.0035  0.0037  0.0045  -0.0009  0.0037  0.0103  0.0213  0.0024  0.0072  0.0118  0.019 
x Fin. Open. [t-5]    [0.0005]  [0.0019]*  [0.0015]**  [0.0039]  [0.0010]  [0.0043]  [0.0035]***  [0.0109]*  [0.0025]  [0.0042]*  [0.0033]***  [0.0102]* 
Financial Deepening [t-5]  (–)  -0.017  -0.0335  0.1445  -0.0358  0.0001  -0.0493  0.0795  -0.0033  -0.0117  -0.0349  0.0926  0.0014 
    [0.0085]**  [0.0307]  [0.0936]  [0.0344]  [0.0119]  [0.0380]  [0.1187]  [0.0536]  [0.0139]  [0.0382]  [0.1208]  [0.0683] 
                            
Per Capita   (+)  0.0037  0.0164  0.016  0.0053  0.0031  0.0187  0.0128  -0.0023  -0.0031  0.0018  0.0049  -0.0134 
Income [t-5]    [0.0015]**  [0.0106]  [0.0104]  [0.0227]  [0.0015]**  [0.0126]  [0.0123]  [0.0273]  [0.0030]  [0.0125]  [0.0159]  [0.0448] 
Inflation [t-5]  (–)  -0.0112  -0.0548  -0.0318  -0.0561  -0.0047  -0.0497  -0.0221  -0.0815  -0.0248  -0.0334  -0.0164  -0.1095 
    [0.0074]  [0.0208]***  [0.0266]  [0.0919]  [0.0074]  [0.0303]  [0.0317]  [0.1166]  [0.0104]**  [0.0293]  [0.0414]  [0.1863] 
Trade   (+)  0.0000  0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0003  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0003  -0.0006 
Openness [t-5]    [0.0000]*  [0.0001]**  [0.0001]  [0.0001]**  [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0002]*  [0.0003]*  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0002]**  [0.0003]** 
                            
N    408  175  206  172  289  101  115  98  138  87  97  85 
Adj. R-sq.    0.15  0.11  0.28  0.03  0.09  0.2  0.16  -0.01  0.16  0.19  0.18  0.01 
 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year 
period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). Observations of 
inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level.    35 
Table 5-2: Financial Development, Financial Openness, and Legal/Institutional Development  
(Components of LEGAL1: Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy Quality) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC  EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: Corrupt (Corruption)   
             
 
 
Financial Openness [t-5]  (+)  -0.0009  -0.0129  -0.0195  -0.0309  0.0009  -0.0112  -0.0313  -0.0610  -0.006  -0.0193  -0.0362  -0.0634 
    [0.0027]  [0.0099]  [0.0071]***  [0.0261]  [0.0038]  [0.0134]  [0.0110]***  [0.0409]  [0.0091]  [0.0146]  [0.0124]***  [0.0460] 
LEVEL: CORRUPT  (+)  0.0001  0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0012  0.0000  0.0014  0.0004  -0.0012  0.0004  0.0016  0.0005  -0.0012 
    [0.0001]  [0.0005]  [0.0003]  [0.0008]  [0.0001]  [0.0007]**  [0.0004]  [0.0011]  [0.0002]*  [0.0007]**  [0.0006]  [0.0016] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0001  0.0002  0.0003  0.0004  0.0000  0.0003  0.0006  0.001  0.0001  0.0005  0.0007  0.0009 
Corrupt x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]**  [0.0003]  [0.0001]  [0.0003]  [0.0002]***  [0.0006]*  [0.0002]  [0.0003]*  [0.0002]***  [0.0006] 
N    408  175  206  172  289  101  115  98  138  87  97  85 
Adj. R-sq.    0.15  0.12  0.28  0.03  0.09  0.23  0.16  -0.01  0.14  0.24  0.18  0.00 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LAO (Law and order)   
             
 
 
Financial Openness [t-5]  (+)  -0.0003  -0.0172  -0.0172  -0.0204  0.004  -0.0217  -0.0218  -0.0627  -0.0078  -0.0278  -0.0239  -0.0536 
    [0.0025]  [0.0097]*  [0.0083]**  [0.0229]  [0.0029]  [0.0125]*  [0.0119]*  [0.0443]  [0.0076]  [0.0107]**  [0.0105]**  [0.0385] 
LEVEL: LAO  (+)  0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0004  0.0003  0.0005  0.0004  0.0005  0.0003  0.0008 
    [0.0001]  [0.0004]  [0.0003]  [0.0007]  [0.0001]  [0.0004]  [0.0003]  [0.0009]  [0.0002]**  [0.0004]  [0.0004]  [0.0011] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0000  0.0003  0.0002  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0004  0.0004  0.0011  0.0001  0.0006  0.0004  0.0008 
LAO x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0000]  [0.0001]**  [0.0001]*  [0.0003]  [0.0001]  [0.0003]  [0.0002]*  [0.0007]  [0.0001]  [0.0002]**  [0.0002]**  [0.0005] 
N    408  175  206  172  289  101  115  98  138  87  97  85 
Adj. R-sq.    0.15  0.12  0.28  0.03  0.09  0.2  0.12  -0.02  0.14  0.19  0.12  -0.01 
Legal/Inst. Variable: BQ (Bureaucracy Quality)   
             
 
 
Financial Openness [t-5]  (+)  0.002  -0.0070  -0.0119  -0.0101  0.0048  0.0057  -0.0268  -0.0562  -0.0035  0.009  -0.0334  -0.0749 
    [0.0024]  [0.0102]  [0.0070]*  [0.0205]  [0.0032]  [0.0107]  [0.0129]**  [0.0333]*  [0.0079]  [0.0136]  [0.0165]**  [0.0471] 
LEVEL: BQ  (+)  0.0001  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0004  0.0001  0.0003  0.0007  0.0014  0.0002  0.0004  0.0009  0.0019 
    [0.0001]*  [0.0004]  [0.0002]  [0.0007]  [0.0001]  [0.0005]  [0.0004]*  [0.0010]  [0.0002]  [0.0006]  [0.0005]*  [0.0014] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0000  0.0001  0.0002  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0006  0.0011  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0007  0.0014 
BQ x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0002]  [0.0001]  [0.0002]  [0.0003]**  [0.0006]**  [0.0001]  [0.0003]  [0.0003]**  [0.0007]* 
N    408  175  206  172  289  101  115  98  138  87  97  85 
Adj. R-sq.    0.15  0.10  0.27  0.02  0.10  0.18  0.17  0.00  0.11  0.15  0.17  0.02 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year period. 
Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). Observations of inflation rates in excess 
of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level.   36 
Table 5-3: Financial Development, Financial Openness, and Legal/Institutional Development  
(LEGAL2: Legal Development pertaining to Financial Transactions) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC/EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL2 
   
         
Financial Openness [t-5]  (+)  0.0036  0.0020  0.0018  0.0053  0.0000  0.0072  0.0111  0.0195 
    [0.0016]**  [0.0053]  [0.0037]  [0.0092]  [0.0020]  [0.0136]  [0.0062]*  [0.0187] 
LEVEL: LEGAL2  (+)  -0.0001  0.0086  0.0027  0.0126  0.001  0.0175  0.0141  0.0288 
    [0.0022]  [0.0066]  [0.0057]  [0.0177]  [0.0033]  [0.0115]  [0.0087]*  [0.0261] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0000  0.0055  0.0036  -0.0028  -0.0013  0.0029  0.0077  0.0113 
LEGAL2 x Fin. Open. [t-5]    [0.0013]  [0.0030]*  [0.0031]  [0.0049]  [0.0017]  [0.0070]  [0.0041]*  [0.0110] 
Financial Deepening [t-5]  (–)  -0.0275  -0.0465  0.0997  -0.0637  -0.0106  -0.0532  0.0212  -0.0467 
    [0.0109]**  [0.0367]  [0.1083]  [0.0434]  [0.0173]  [0.0454]  [0.1442]  [0.0684] 
Per Capita Income [t-5]  (+)  0.0025  0.0004  0.0047  -0.0125  0.0034  0.0161  0.012  -0.0039 
    [0.0026]  [0.0097]  [0.0084]  [0.0244]  [0.0033]  [0.0112]  [0.0112]  [0.0314] 
Inflation [t-5]  (–)  -0.0237  -0.0423  -0.0203  0.005  -0.0206  -0.0404  -0.0016  0.0108 
    [0.0140]*  [0.0262]  [0.0345]  [0.1032]  [0.0149]  [0.0305]  [0.0381]  [0.1350] 
Trade Openness [t-5]  (+)  0.0000  0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0007 
    [0.0000]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]*  [0.0000]  [0.0003]  [0.0002]  [0.0005] 
N    188  124  148  123  93  60  68  59 
Adj. R-sq.    0.11  0.10  0.29  0.05  0.17  0.14  0.12  -0.05 
 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five 
year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). Observations 
of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level. Due to the data 
availability of the LLSV variables, there is only one subsample for non-industrialized countries, which we call LDC/EMG.   37 
Table 5-4: Financial Development, Financial Openness, and Legal/Institutional Development  
(Creditor Protection, Contract Enforcement, Shareholder Protection, and Accounting Standards) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC/EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: CREDITOR (Creditor Protection)           
Financial   (+)  0.0003  0.0031  0.0036  0.0032  0.0011  -0.0013  -0.0021  -0.0058 
Openness [t-5]    [0.0022]  [0.0060]  [0.0055]  [0.0105]  [0.0038]  [0.0050]  [0.0049]  [0.0205] 
LEVEL: CREDITOR  (+)  0.0029  -0.0020  0.0012  0.0169  0.0030  0.0027  0.009  0.0202 
    [0.0016]*  [0.0038]  [0.0035]  [0.0089]*  [0.0018]*  [0.0035]  [0.0045]*  [0.0118]* 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0012  -0.0003  -0.0014  -0.0018  -0.0001  0.0014  0.0017  0.0006 
CREDITOR x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0010]  [0.0023]  [0.0021]  [0.0034]  [0.0014]  [0.0023]  [0.0017]  [0.0048] 
N    230  145  169  143  129  80  88  78 
Adj. R-sq.    0.14  0.07  0.27  0.05  0.15  0.19  0.12  -0.01 
Legal/Inst. Variable: ENFORCE (Contract Enforcement)           
Financial   (+)  -0.0044  -0.0342  -0.0211  -0.0246  -0.0080  -0.0531  -0.0587  -0.1509 
Openness [t-5]    [0.0057]  [0.0160]**  [0.0125]*  [0.0427]  [0.0131]  [0.0231]**  [0.0203]***  [0.0974] 
LEVEL: ENFORCE  (+)  0.0020  -0.0068  -0.0030  0.0002  0.0059  0.0037  0.0097  0.0077 
    [0.0014]  [0.0070]  [0.0058]  [0.0219]  [0.0028]**  [0.0080]  [0.0079]  [0.0342] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0009  0.0051  0.003  0.0034  0.0015  0.0093  0.0100  0.0243 
ENFORCE x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0007]  [0.0021]**  [0.0017]*  [0.0054]  [0.0021]  [0.0042]**  [0.0033]***  [0.0144]* 
N    240  151  178  149  139  86  97  84 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.11  0.28  0.04  0.16  0.23  0.18  0.03 
Legal/Inst. Variable: SHRIGHTS (Shareholder Protection)           
Financial   (+)  0.0031  0.0039  0.0021  0.0237  -0.0032  0.0002  0.0026  0.0353 
Openness [t-5]    [0.0022]  [0.0047]  [0.0042]  [0.0148]  [0.0043]  [0.0065]  [0.0060]  [0.0205]* 
LEVEL: SHRIGHTS  (+)  0.0007  0.0105  0.0015  0.0186  0.0011  0.0124  0.0033  0.0174 
    [0.0010]  [0.0043]**  [0.0029]  [0.0173]  [0.0017]  [0.0055]**  [0.0050]  [0.0220] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  0.0000  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0091  0.0019  0.0017  0.0001  -0.0155 
SHRIGHTS x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0007]  [0.0022]  [0.0017]  [0.0073]  [0.0013]  [0.0042]  [0.0030]  [0.0099] 
N    234  147  174  145  133  82  93  80 
Adj. R-sq.    0.11  0.11  0.27  0.07  0.13  0.21  0.11  0.03 
Legal/Inst. Variable: ACCOUNT (Accounting Standards)           
Financial   (+)  0.0105  -0.0298  -0.0234  -0.0046  0.0137  0.0112  -0.0087  -0.0391 
Openness [t-5]    [0.0076]  [0.0184]  [0.0150]  [0.0227]  [0.0111]  [0.0208]  [0.0147]  [0.0388] 
LEVEL: ACCOUNT  (+)  -0.0012  0.0106  0.0030  0.0048  -0.0017  0.0084  0.0045  0.0113 
    [0.0016]  [0.0052]**  [0.0033]  [0.0061]  [0.0026]  [0.0079]  [0.0047]  [0.0098] 
INTERACTION:   (+)  -0.0011  0.0050  0.004  0.0016  -0.0023  -0.0015  0.0021  0.008 
ACCOUNT x Fin. Opn. [t-5]    [0.0012]  [0.0031]  [0.0025]  [0.0032]  [0.0018]  [0.0047]  [0.0027]  [0.0062] 
N    200  130  157  129  105  66  77  65 
Adj. R-sq.    0.11  0.12  0.29  0.05  0.20  0.16  0.09  -0.06 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year 
period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). 
Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the 
(10%)[5%]{1%} level.   38 
Table 6: Difference between LDCs and EMGs in terms of  
the Total effect of a one-unit increase in KAOPEN  
when the dependent variable is SMTV 
    LDC  EMG 
[A]  Total effect of KA Openness  –0.0006  0.0041 
[B]  L  (Legal1)  –0.74  –0.28 
[C]  Threshold level of Legal1  –0.68 
[A]  Total effect of KA Openness  –0.0017  0.0015 
[B]  L  (Corrupt)  49.27  54.73 
[C]  Threshold level of Corrupt  52.2 
[A]  Total effect of KA Openness  –0.0015  0.0005 
[B]  L  (LAO)  50.85  55.76 
[C]  Threshold level of LAO  54.5 
[A]  Total effect of KA Openness  0.0024  0.0071 
[B]  L  (BQ)  48.66  56.44 
[C]  Threshold level of BQ  44.7 
[A]  Total effect of KA Openness  0.0052  – 
[B]  L  (Legal2)  –0.77  – 
[C]  Threshold level of Legal2  –1.44   
Notes:  “Total Effect” [A] indicates the total effect of a one-unit increase in 
KAOPEN when the legal/institutional variable takes the value of the average 
in the subsample group (L , shown in [B]). The estimation model is based on 
equation (1) using the data of the LDC subgroup for the regressions with 
LEGAL1 legal variables and of the LDC/EMG subgroup for the regressions 
with LEGAL2. Rows [C] show the threshold level of the legal variable above 
which the capital account openness has a positive impact on financial 
development. For the analysis with LEGAL2, there is no distinction between 
LDC and EMG due to data availability, but there is a subgroup LDC/EMG.   39 
Table 7: Determinants of Capital Account and Trade Openness 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
 
 
Dependent Variable:    Financial Openness (t)  Trade Openness (t) 
  Pred.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Sign  Full  LDC  EMG  Full  LDC  EMG 
Financial Openness (t-5)  +  0.5939  0.5313  0.3499  -0.0001  0.0019  -0.0005 
    [0.0580]***  [0.0794]***  [0.1176]***  [0.0015]  [0.0022]  [0.0028] 
Trade Openness (t-5)  +  2.1763  2.0317  1.9427  0.5938  0.5633  0.5746 
    [1.0279]**  [1.0586]**  [2.0338]  [0.0794]***  [0.0857]***  [0.0940]*** 
Avg. Budget Surplus (t-1|t-5)  +  0.0402  0.0537  0.0618  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
    [0.0151]***  [0.0177]***  [0.0305]**  [0.0005]  [0.0007]  [0.0006] 
Avg. Total reserves (t-1|t-5)   +  -0.0049  0.0043  0.0124       
    [0.0245]  [0.0304]  [0.0413]       
Avg. GDP per capita (t-1|t-5)  +  0.3034  0.1945  0.5135  0.0174  0.0196  0.0339 
    [0.0971]***  [0.1157]*  [0.2821]*  [0.0035]***  [0.0047]***  [0.0086]*** 
Number of Observations    263  181  100  223  151  82 
Adjusted R
2    0.59  0.42  0.35  0.75  0.63  0.70 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Budget surplus, total 
reserves, and GDP per capita are included at the average over t-1 through t-5. Constant and regional dummies for Asia, Europe, 
Middle East, and Africa are also included in the regression, but their estimated coefficients are not reported. The regression 
estimations are conducted in non-overlapping manners with the observations excepted for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 
excluded. 
   40 
Table 8: Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis  
Instrumented by per capita output, budget balance, and trade openness¶ 
LEGAL1 (General Legal/Institutional Development) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC  EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Value  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Value  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Value  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL1             
 
 
Financial   (+)  0.0024  0.0057  0.0019  -0.0033  0.0000  0.0186  0.0210  0.0079  0.0011  0.0108  0.0172  -0.0029 
Openness [t-5]    [0.0031]  [0.0061]  [0.0051]  [0.0106]  [0.0033]  [0.0094]*  [0.0075]***  [0.0125]  [0.0037]  [0.0074]  [0.0065]**  [0.0253] 
LEVEL:   (+)  0.0022  0.0041  0.0032  -0.0053  0.0006  0.0265  0.0116  -0.0184  0.0052  0.0198  0.0088  -0.0213 
LEGAL1    [0.0015]  [0.0047]  [0.0025]  [0.0123]  [0.0025]  [0.0092]***  [0.0057]**  [0.0252]  [0.0042]  [0.0089]**  [0.0053]*  [0.0285] 
INTERACT.: LEGAL1x  (+)  0.0007  0.0030  0.0041  0.0061  -0.0003  0.0043  0.0112  0.0231  0.0036  0.0053  0.0096  0.0223 
Fin. Open. [t-5]    [0.0010]  [0.0024]  [0.0022]*  [0.0052]  [0.0015]  [0.0051]  [0.0037]***  [0.0142]  [0.0024]  [0.0039]  [0.0032]***  [0.0149] 
Financial   (–)  -0.0109  -0.0426  0.0785  -0.0447  0.0257  -0.0805  -0.1180  -0.0196  -0.0133  -0.0617  -0.0931  -0.0227 
Deepening [t-5]    [0.0134]  [0.0291]  [0.0901]  [0.0408]  [0.0162]  [0.0326]**  [0.0777]  [0.0582]  [0.0246]  [0.0298]**  [0.0665]  [0.0688] 
                            
Inflation [t-5]  (–)  -0.0218  -0.0522  -0.0053  -0.0070  -0.005  -0.0508  0.0196  -0.0028  -0.0312  -0.0557  0.0236  -0.0437 
    [0.0098]**  [0.0223]**  [0.0291]  [0.1005]  [0.0102]  [0.0293]*  [0.0319]  [0.1243]  [0.0160]*  [0.0279]*  [0.0391]  [0.2139] 
                            
N    189  140  152  138  117  77  83  75  70  66  70  65 
 R-sq.    0.17  0.14  0.27  0.09  0.17  0.29  0.04  0.10  0.28  0.36  0.10  0.15 
 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over 
a five year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). 
Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} 
level.  
¶- The variable for financial openness lagged five years (KAOPENt-5) is instrumented by per capita output and budget balance, both of which are 
included as the average over the five years prior to five years before each window (i.e., t-10 through t-6 since the IV is already lagged five years), 
regional dummies, and the level of financial openness and trade openness, both of which are lagged ten years.  41 
 
Table 9: Order of Financial Liberalization  
(LEGAL1,Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy Quality) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC  EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL1 (General Level of Legal/Institutional Development) 
         
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0033  0.0282  -0.0028  0.0133  -0.0034  0.1306  0.1040  0.0624  0.0033  0.0701  0.0861  0.0454 
Development (t–5)    [0.0064]  [0.0286]  [0.0336]  [0.0307]  [0.0070]  [0.0646]**  [0.0499]**  [0.0554]  [0.0089]  [0.0710]  [0.0578]  [0.0660] 
N    169  169  199  166  97  97  111  94  85  86  96  84 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.11  0.27  0.02  0.07  0.27  0.22  -0.02  0.15  0.21  0.21  -0.01 
Legal/Inst. Variable: CORRUPT (Corruption) 
 
             
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0025  0.0285  -0.0031  0.0189  -0.0046  0.1262  0.1008  0.0747  0.0014  0.0641  0.0872  0.0746 
Development (t–5)    [0.0067]  [0.0281]  [0.0333]  [0.0310]  [0.0078]  [0.0610]**  [0.0470]**  [0.0545]  [0.0099]  [0.0620]  [0.0514]*  [0.0622] 
N    169  169  199  166  97  97  111  94  85  86  96  84 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.11  0.27  0.02  0.07  0.30  0.21  -0.02  0.12  0.26  0.21  -0.01 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LAO (Law and Order) 
 
             
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0039  0.0329  -0.0023  0.0136  -0.0008  0.142  0.1023  0.0484  0.0076  0.0988  0.0925  0.0332 
Development (t–5)    [0.0064]  [0.0291]  [0.0339]  [0.0309]  [0.0064]  [0.0640]**  [0.0499]**  [0.0548]  [0.0085]  [0.0708]  [0.0562]  [0.0720] 
N    169  169  199  166  97  97  111  94  85  86  96  84 
Adj. R-sq.    0.11  0.12  0.27  0.01  0.08  0.29  0.17  -0.04  0.12  0.23  0.16  -0.02 
Legal/Inst. Variable: BQ (Bureaucracy Quality) 
 
             
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0026  0.0269  -0.0050  0.0102  -0.0025  0.1292  0.0982  0.0397  0.0032  0.0776  0.0684  0.0238 
Development (t–5)    [0.0066]  [0.0288]  [0.0337]  [0.0317]  [0.0070]  [0.0615]**  [0.0532]*  [0.0582]  [0.0103]  [0.0607]  [0.0572]  [0.0702] 
N    169  169  199  166  97  97  111  94  85  86  96  84 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.10  0.26  0.01  0.06  0.25  0.21  -0.02  0.08  0.17  0.19  0.01 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five 
year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). 
Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level.   42 
Table 10: Relationship between Different Types of Financial Development 
(Controlled for LEGAL1,Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy Quality) 
FULL, LDC, and EMG: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
    FULL  LDC  EMG 
     Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt 
   Pred  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover  Credit  Capital'n  Total Val.  Turnover 
   sign  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL1 (General Level of Legal/Institutional Development) 
       
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0410  0.1769  0.0443  -0.1059  0.0910  0.7073  0.5069  -0.1026  0.0609  0.4044  0.3362  -0.2559 
Development (t|t–5)    [0.0504]  [0.2149]  [0.1745]  [0.2432]  [0.0402]** [0.2446]***  [0.3314]  [0.6457]  [0.0440]  [0.2111]*  [0.3061]  [0.7226] 
N    165  165  195  162  93  93  107  90  84  84  94  82 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.10  0.27  0.02  0.13  0.24  0.18  -0.03  0.17  0.2  0.18  -0.01 
Legal/Inst. Variable: Corrupt (Corruption) 
 
             
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0385  0.1614  0.0403  -0.0887  0.0893  0.6745  0.4858  -0.1425  0.0559  0.3538  0.3605  -0.0175 
Development (t|t–5)    [0.0502]  [0.2186]  [0.1758]  [0.2468]  [0.0405]**  [0.2572]**  [0.3346]  [0.6512]  [0.0453]  [0.2225]  [0.3242]  [0.6922] 
N    165  165  195  162  93  93  107  90  84  84  94  82 
Adj. R-sq.    0.13  0.10  0.27  0.02  0.12  0.26  0.17  -0.03  0.14  0.24  0.18  –0.02 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LAO (Law and Order) 
 
             
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0403  0.1701  0.0394  -0.1102  0.0934  0.7617  0.5088  -0.0498  0.0630  0.4332  0.4339  -0.1560 
Development (t|t–5)    [0.0499]  [0.2135]  [0.1743]  [0.2397]  [0.0411]** [0.2352]***  [0.3244]  [0.5951]  [0.0443]  [0.2055]**  [0.3160]  [0.7124] 
N    165  165  195  162  93  93  107  90  84  84  94  82 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.11  0.27  0.01  0.14  0.25  0.13  -0.04  0.15  0.20  0.14  –0.03 
Legal/Inst. Variable: BQ (Bureaucracy Quality) 
             
 
 
Other type of Financial  +/–  0.0427  0.1862  0.0525  -0.1068  0.0872  0.7163  0.4693  -0.1257  0.0856  0.5783  0.4021  -0.1157 
Development (t|t–5)    [0.0501]  [0.2133]  [0.1724]  [0.2384]  [0.0414]** [0.2353]***  [0.3267]  [0.6790]  [0.0515]  [0.1907]***  [0.2379]*  [0.5846] 
N    165  165  195  162  93  93  107  90  84  84  94  82 
Adj. R-sq.    0.12  0.09  0.26  0.01  0.12  0.22  0.18  -0.03  0.12  0.18  0.18  0.01 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five 
year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). 
Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level.  43 
Figure 1: Correlation between the Change in KAOPEN and the change in SMTV 
(with a five-year lag) 
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